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ARE VIABLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND EFFECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY IRRECONCILABLE AIMS?

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INTRODUCTION

> ...it is most especially in the conduct of foreign relations that democratic governments appear to me to be decidedly inferior to governments carried on upon different principles. ...Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those faculties in which it is deficient...a democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design, and to work out its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy, and it will not await their consequences with patience.[1]

Viable democratic government and effective foreign policy are irreconcilable aims in the absolute, in the extreme, and in the ultimate projection. Perfect viability of a democratic government and perfect efficacy of foreign policy are mutually exclusive aims since the prerequisites of one are antithetical to the prerequisites of the other. The problem posed, however, is not considered to be taken in the absolute, nor is it expected that a distinctly positive or negative stand is desired. Rather, the question is believed to be a springboard from which can be launched an inquiry concerned with the relationship of effective foreign policy to a viable democratic government. For the purposes of this inquiry, the writer will take the position that a democratic government, vis-a-vis other forms of government, has inherent disadvantages in the formulation and execution of effective foreign policy.

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[1] Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 160-161.

At the outset, the writer desires to make clear that he is a staunch proponent of democracy as both a way of life and a form of government and would not see either sacrificed to the altar of efficiency or effectiveness. His contention is that the founders of a democratic government are aware of its weaknesses in the field of international relations, but choose to place individual rights, liberties and freedoms in a paramount position, sacrificing, if necessary, the government's potential strength on the international level.

As stated this study will be an inquiry into the relationship between a democratic government and effective foreign policy. It is beyond the scope of the inquiry, and the writer's abilities, to recommend a panacea for this dichotomous relationship.

In organization and methodology, this inquiry is divided into three major sections. The first deals with the concept of democracy, its *raison d'etre*, types, principles, definition, and values. This, in turn, is followed by a discussion of the American application of democratic principles to its form of government. The second section is concerned with foreign policy, its place within a government, its types, bases, and purposes. American foreign policy is then examined with particular emphasis upon its formulation. Thirdly, the American experience is used to reveal the innate disadvantages of a democracy in formulating and carrying out an effective foreign policy.

DEMOCRACY

Government is an instrument whereby the authority or sovereignty of a group of people is represented and exercised through agencies and institutions for the formulation and execution of the peoples' will. Within that grouping of people--the state--government is intended to protect members from each other and from other groupings of people. In attempting to do this, governments take many diverse forms, from anarchy, or absence of government, to totalitarianism, or complete governmental control and hegemony over all persons and activities within the state.

Aristotle classified government according to the number of people who participated in its affairs and set forth both good and perverted governments. The good government of one-man rule is monarchy, the perversion is tyranny; the good government of the rule of few is aristocracy, the perversion, oligarchy; the good of the rule of the many is polity, the perversion, mobocracy. His classification, while useful in the broadest terms, is descriptive rather than analytical, for all governments, in day-to-day operation, are of the few. A better means of classification would appear to be one based upon the location or distribution of sovereignty. In anarchy, each individual retains his individual sovereignty. Under totalitarianism, no individual retains sovereignty, and the totalitarian leader usurps the individual sovereignty of all members of the state. Between these extremes of the political spectrum would reside the diverse

forms of government mentioned above. Democracy, however, cannot, with validity, be placed in one location within the political spectrum, for there are widely divergent democratic theories on the location and distribution of sovereignty. Witness the proliferation of "Modified" democracies existing today: Totalitarian Democracy, Peoples' Democracy, Proletarian Democracy, Guided Democracy, Plebiscitary Democracy, Bourgeoisie Democracy, Athenian Democracy, Social Democracy, Pure Democracy, and Direct Democracy to name a few.

Thus democracy means many things to many people and is virtually subject to individual interpretation as to its "real" meaning. Further, it is frequently used in connotations which transcend the political realm, such as, "democratic way of life," etc. When thus used, it assumes an emotional mantle that defies description or classification.

Notwithstanding its extrapolitical connotations, there are certain characteristics or principles of democracy which are almost universally valid (absolute universally-valid principles would be so all-encompassing that their value in any investigation would be useless). Perhaps the first principle should be majority rule, and its attendant minority protection. Normally the decision of the majority is reflected through representatives and implies the consultation and consent of the majority of the electorate.

Secondly, the political status of all members of the state, with reference to their voting equality, is generally considered an intrinsic principle of democracy. The franchise is equally distributed without regard to race, color, creed, wealth, social position, or education among all adult members of the state so that the policy-makers, in

exercise of a portion of an individual's sovereignty, can give expression to his will.

Herein lies a third characteristic of most democracies and that is direct popular control over policy-makers and their actions, by periodic elections, and indirect control, through representation, normally exercised through the institution and position of a legislature. One writer on this subject has said:

> The difference between an authoritarian and a democratic state centers on the position of the representative body. If the Legislature is free and strong, authoritarian rule cannot exist. Without it, there can be no democratic government. Subject only to the sovereign people, the Legislature must have the ultimate power in a democracy.[2]

A fourth principle of democracies emanates from the relationship between the people and the policy-makers and is that the individual must have the political freedom to exercise effectively his collective control over policy-makers by means of organization, usually in the form of political parties and political communications.

One further characteristic of a democracy which bears mention is that all actions within the state, from the expression of majority rule to the maintenance of internal order, are designed to be peaceable and to avoid violence.

These five characteristics or principles, then, constitute a description of most democracies and provide a basis from which a viable definition of a democratic government may be derived. The writer of this essay is unable to improve upon that rendered by H.B. Mayo who states:

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[2] Thomas K. Finletter, Can Representative Government Do The Job? (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1945), p. 13.

> A democratic political system is one in which public policies are made, on a majority basis, by representatives subject to effective control at periodic elections which are conducted on the principle of political equality and under conditions of political freedom.[3]

From the principles which serve as the basis for the above definition flow certain values which are characteristic of a democracy. From the principle of avoidance of violence come the values of peaceful change and the voluntary settlement of disputes through a minimum of coercion and force. From these and from the principle of popular control over policy-makers comes the value of the orderly and peaceful succession of leaders. Further, from the principles of political equality and freedom come one of the core values of a democracy: Justice must be applied equally to even the most pluralistic groupings within the state.

These principles and values, taken together, delimit the general, all-encompassing meaning of the term "democracy" and begin to narrow its interpretation to an Anglo-Saxon conception. However, because the term is still so amorphous, one must further limit its connotations and choose a political moment and location in time in order to investigate its composition and institutions. As his democratic plane of reference, the writer chooses the American experience with democratic government.

American democracy has historically been characterized by two major political devices, majority rule and civil rights. Majority rule has already been mentioned. Civil rights, as used by the writer, embrace those individual rights which require protection from encroachment by both the government itself and by other individuals within the state. The

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[3] H.B. Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 70.

basic American civil rights are delineated in, but not limited to, the Bill of Rights and amendments XIII, XIV, and XV of the United States Constitution. Democratic thought in America has primarily concerned itself with two internal political relationships: that of the individual to the State and of individuals to one another. External relationships and security were presumed guaranteed by insular isolation, the Pax Britannica, and weak continental neighbors.

The Founding Fathers considered that individuals could be adequately protected from one another by the mere existence of government, legislation, and law enforcement. Their primary concern centered on the relationship between the individual and the State and they championed the paramountcy of the individual. In order to protect his freedoms, they purposely limited the powers of government:

> It was with this purpose in mind that the American Constitution divided authority between the States and the Federal Government, and within the latter, among executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Federalism and the separation of powers were deliberately designed to keep all governments--and especially the National Government--weak.[4]

Thus from the birth of the American democratic experience, institutional safeguards were adopted in order to restrain the powers of government and protect individual rights. In addition to the separation of powers and checks and balances mentioned above, the framers of the Constitution entrusted specific powers to the Federal government with the stipulation that all reserved powers belonged to the individual states and their inhabitants.

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[4] John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961), pp. 4-5.

As a result of these institutional safeguards, an American Federal government emerged which was structurally unique in the world. Federalism divided powers between the states and the central government. Within the Federal government, powers were further divided among the Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary, with a system of checks and balances that was intended to preclude the ascendancy of one branch to a tyrannical position. Further, although the President alone heads the executive branch and represents its power, both the legislative and judicial branches contain their own systems of checks and balances. The Legislature is denied unanimity by its bicameralism and by the interplay of political parties, interest groups, sectional interests, and public opinion. In the Judiciary, perfect unity is discouraged by the plurality and diversity of the Supreme Court Members.

Having briefly discussed the institutional structure of the American democratic government, the writer will proceed to inquire as to the specific powers, and divisions of power, among the branches.

As previously mentioned, the American states are entrusted with the reserved powers not specifically given to the central government. In addition, by the Constitution, the rights and immunities of citizens of each state are protected from encroachment by other states. New states entering the United States have equal rights with older states and each state is guaranteed a republican form of government.

The Constitution allocated to the Federal government, in general, only those powers which were thought to be necessary for the accomplishment of objectives transcending the abilities of states individually or collectively. These specific powers are presented in the dis-

cussion of the Federal branches having responsibility for their implementation. However, before leaving the general treatment of the National government, one must distinguish between Constitutional appearance and reality. In practice, there has been a gradual accretion of powers in the central government, especially within the executive branch, that was not intended by the Constitution, which expected the Legislature to be the supreme branch.

The Constitution established a bicameral Legislature with a Senate for geographical representation and a House of Representatives equally apportioned according to population. All legislative powers of the Federal government are vested, jointly between the two houses, in Congress. Among the most important powers conferred upon Congress are those of taxation, the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce, the coinage of money, the declaration of war, the appropriation of monies, and, exclusively to the Senate, the ratification and approval of treaties and appointments. More than any other branch, the Legislature, and particularly the House of Representatives, reflects the desires or discontent of the body politic, and public opinion, whether collective, sectional, or particular.

The executive branch is headed by a popularly-elected President who is the sole responsible constitutional officer. He is aided in the execution of his powers by a popularly-elected Vice-President and by appointed heads of executive departments. Constitutionally, the following major powers, both executive and federative, are conferred upon him: He shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, he shall make Treaties and appoint

ambassadors, judges of the Supreme Court, and other officers of the United States; he shall receive ambassadors; and "...take care that the Laws be faithfully executed...."[5] As mentioned, however, there has been a gradual accretion of power within the executive branch of government that has come about as a result of usage and interpretation. From his Commander-in-Chief powers, the Executive has derived the power to commit the nation publicly to specified policies and courses of action. From his treaty powers, the President has derived the power to conclude executive agreements. From his power to receive ambassadors and diplomatic representatives, the Executive has derived the power of recognition. And, from his powers to see that laws are faithfully executed, the President has derived wide emergency powers, applicable both domestically and externally. The executive branch comes closest to representing unity and cohesiveness among the three Federal branches.

The Constitution established a Judiciary as an independent and co-equal branch of the Federal government, composed of a Supreme Court and such inferior courts as should be established by Congress. The most important power entrusted to the judicial branch is one of those least used: that the Supreme Court has the right to judge the validity of acts of the other branches of government. The Judiciary is a legalistic guarantor of individual democratic rights and the system of separation of powers and checks and balances.

These, then, are the theoretical and institutional bases of American democracy. In order to preserve the future existence of

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[5] U.S. Constitution, II, sec. 3, cl. 4.

democratic principles and values within the United States and to permit their growth and development, the writer believes that the Legislature, with its diverse influences and considerations, should retain an equal position with the Executive in the formulation and execution of domestic objectives and policies. This is best accomplished and guaranteed by the continued reliance upon checks and balances as protection against Executive omnipotence and tyranny. Only through diffusion of authority and pluralistic representation can viable democratic government be ensured.

FOREIGN POLICY

Each state has principles and values which it wishes to protect and promote. These can be as unsophisticated as the basic raison d'etat or they can involve complex ideological dogma based upon the social, economic, and political ideas of a society, upon a unique interpretation of history, a set of aims or objectives, or a standard of conduct and national behavior. Regardless of their scope, there exist principles which underlie the actions of every state.

In addition to these underlying principles, each state possesses interests which it considers paramount. A state's basic interest is for self-preservation and well-being and this situation would remain valid even if the state were in a perfect vacuum. Since, however, no state is isolated from the effects of the existence of other states, additional interests come into prominence. Each state, as well as pursuing internal interests, is concerned with the maintenance of its security and, as an outgrowth, the maintenance of international stability. These National Interests are defined as "The general and continuing ends for which a nation acts."[6] Whereas the form in which these National Interests are stated are constantly changing, they themselves remain as constants, with principles, underlying all actions taken by the state. Actions taken to support the National Interests fall into two categories: those which take place internally and those which transcend the domestic arena and

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[6] The Brookings Institution, Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy 1952-1953 (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta, 1952), p. 373.

transpire externally or internationally. This essay is concerned primarily with the latter, within which context the term will be used.

It is significant to note that all states' National Interests differ since they are independently conditioned by indigenous political, social, economic, intellectual, religious, and geographic influences. Further, they are uniquely conditioned by divergent principles, or sources of action.

Whenever the National Interests of a state are confronted or challenged and move from the universal to the precise and assume a particular form they become objectives. Objectives, therefore, are interests particularized to meet specific international situations, to challenge or complement the National Interests of other states.

In order to implement objectives, states must devise and pursue specific courses of action, called policies. Policies, in general, are courses of action to secure objectives which protect or promote the National Interests. Foreign policies are those courses of action designed to have impact or effect in the international arena, in interplay with the courses of action of other states seeking to obtain objectives to further their own National Interests.

One further definition is desirable before proceeding to an inquiry concerned with foreign policy. Whereas policies are specific courses of action, commitments are specific undertakings in support of those policies.

As an illustration to demonstrate the validity of these definitions, let us apply them to the present situation in Laos. The President of the United States views further Communist expansion as a threat to our security and well-being, our National Interests. He, therefore,

decides to particularize those interests by making it an American objective to check further Communist expansion. The policy pursued to attain this objective is to provide aid and assistance to those countries outside of the Communist bloc and the commitments undertaken in support of this policy include sending military advisors and equipment to Laos and the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Gulf of Siam. However, the President was not without restraints on the action that he might have taken, for our American principles dictate that National Interests, and the actions taken to protect or promote them, must be within the framework of International Law.

The above example, and particularly the restraining effect of principles on action undertaken in defense of the National Interests, provides the springboard from which an inquiry on foreign policy can be launched.

It appears to this writer that all human actions are conditioned by one's concept of the nature of man. Admittedly, this may appear to be an oversimplification, but the writer contends that its validity and viability are apparent in the theory of international relations and can be adequately traced to the principles which underlie the actions of every state. One can consider the nature of man as being either intrinsically good or innately "evil" and power-seeking. It is considered that this division forms the basis for the two schools of theory concerned with international relations and states' actions in support of their National Interests. Those who support the "goodness" of man believe in a harmony of interests among states; those who believe that man is intrinsically power-seeking contend that conflict among states is inevitable.

Before continuing, it should be made clear that the writer intends to generalize in support of his position and that the generalizations expounded will be subject to many exceptions. Generally speaking, however, those who believe in a harmony of interests among states usually associate themselves with the following concepts of international relations: Idealism; peaceful cooperation; Internationalism; World Peace; Legalism; International Morality; and Utopianism. While those who preach the inevitability of conflict among states frequently associate themselves with: Realism, Balance of Power policies; Nationalism; power as the sole guarantor of a state's continued existence; Pragmatic Moralism among states; and Pragmatism.

Admittedly also, these two pure poles of theoretical difference are not epitomized by any extant state. Rather, they constitute the limits of a conceptual spectrum on which, at various locations, the principles underlying a state's international objectives, policies, and commitments are found.

As an illustration in support of this theory, the writer contends that the foreign policies of Hitler's Germany were relatively close to the conflict pole while those of Wilson's America approached the harmony pole. In actuality, of course, a state's foreign policies are conditioned by principles which reflect ever--changing combinations of theories of both pure poles and these combinations are so myriad that no two states have identical foreign policies, objectives, or commitments. Therefore, in order to conduct an inquiry concerning foreign policy, one must, again, select a plane of reference, an international relations point and place in time. The writer chooses to examine American foreign policy as the subject of

his inquiry. Contemporary American foreign policy can be broadly described as resulting from both external and internal factors and stimuli, operating within the framework of International Law and accepted diplomatic practices, disdaining force and power whenever possible, and designed to implement the objectives of International Peace and cooperation among nations. American foreign policies combine, then, the concepts of Realism and Idealism, Power and Peace, and Nationalism and Internationalism.

Any combination of concepts, however, is constantly changing and the contemporary one only emerged after 1947. Prior to that time, as a brief resume of history will show, the United States emphasized different concepts which underlay the principles which conditioned its foreign policies. The first was based upon Realism, Nationalistic Idealism, and a rejection of power, and manifested itself in the form of isolationism. This manifestation has, to the present, been an undercurrent of American principles and, at various times, when the interests of the country turned inward, has come to the fore as a primary concept relating the United States to the external world. Its first major emergence was during the period of Reconstruction, Western settlement, and industrial development from 1865 to 1890. Its second was during both the period of retreat from responsibility and economic catastrophe from 1919 to 1937, epitomized by the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, the Depression, and the embargo and neutrality legislation of the 1930's.

A second concept was that of the Balance of Power, which has been an undulating concept, ascending to pre-eminence only when economically, strategically, politically, or militarily expedient. It

appeared in 1778 in the form of a Treaty of Alliance with France; during the Civil War, in a negative sense, to prevent a New World Balance of Power between the Confederacy and European states; in Latin America until the Good Neighbor era; in Asia with the Open Door policy; to a certain degree, preceding American entry into the two World Wars; and from 1945-1947.

A third concept was that based upon the use of power as a means for territorial, political, and economic expansion. Further, in a negative sense, it was the use of power to prevent the expansion of European states into areas of American interests. This reliance upon power played a vital role in conditioning American foreign policies. The War of 1812, fought by the United States for the incompatible purposes of "Peace and Profits", was based upon an assertion of Freedom of the Seas, the American right to trade, and American territorial expansion. Further, the acquisition of Texas, California, and Oregon, under the guise of Manifest Destiny, was territorial and political expansion through power, as was the acquisition of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines by "New" Manifest Destiny after the Spanish-American War. Taft's Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean was an American demonstration of power and, in a negative sense, both the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt corollary thereto constituted the use of power to deny the Western hemisphere to European states.

Idealism, coupled with moralism and legalism, comprised the final major concept underlying American principles. The indigenous form which it took was a result of isolationism and was based upon the repudiation of European power politics, the belief that democracy was synonymous with peace, that harmonious peace was the antithesis of power politics,

and that it was America's destiny to spread its kind of freedom and liberty to all mankind. This concept of American moral superiority over Europe was first expressed in the Monroe Doctrine and later became the purported rationalization for the Spanish-American War. In the form of Christian morality coupled with American democracy, it became President Wilson's motivating force. It was the clarion call for United States' entry into both World Wars and manifested itself in the League of Nations, the Kellog-Briand Pact, and in America's intransigent position of basing recognition upon de jure factors alone.

Since 1947, and the emergence into what the writer chooses to call "Internationalism", the United States has forsaken the concept of isolationism, watered down that of Nationalistic Idealism and has rejected power as a means for territorial expansionism. The United States has substituted therefor new theories which emphasize international cooperation, world peace, and collective security, in order to define objectives and devise and implement policies which protect and promote the National Interests in an ever-changing international milieu.

Here, then, are the diverse forms that one state's objectives and foreign policies may assume in less than two hundred years. Whether they entail political, social, territorial, military, or economic complexions, or combinations thereof, and regardless of their success or failure, they are designed to enhance the National Interests.

These are the types, purposes, and theoretical bases of American foreign policies. One must now proceed to an investigation concerned with the specific operation of American foreign affairs. According to a Brookings Institution study:

> The essence of the conduct of foreign affairs is the regulation of the numerous phases of the relationships between this nation and other nations. The framework within which this process takes place comprises the relevant provisions of the Constitution as they have been interpreted and applied through statutes, executive orders, administrative rules, judicial decisions, treaties and other international agreements, and practices based on precedent. The framework has two basic features: the supremacy of the federal government in the conduct of foreign relations, and the separation of powers in the three branches of the federal government itself.[7]

Foreign affairs is itself divided into two aspects: foreign policy formulation and foreign policy execution. This essay is concerned primarily with the former, but will include the latter.

Generally speaking, American foreign policy, as has been mentioned, is formulated with respect to both external and internal, formal and informal factors.

Formal external factors include International Law, treaties entered into with other states, alliances, collective security and collective defense commitments, and the like. Informal external factors include the actions and behavior of all other states, an amorphous "universal standard of morality", world public opinion, and commonly-accepted diplomatic practices, tradition, and customs. Whereas the formal factors, and diplomatic practices, are relatively constant and unchanging, the informal factors are extremely volatile and capricious. The vicissitudes of the informal factors tend to impart an indefinite ever-changing quality to American foreign policy. The reason for this is that few, if any, deliberations take place that are not affected by external factors in the course of foreign policy formulation. In many ways, these external factors, especially those which are formal,

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[7] The Brookings Institution, Governmental Mechanism for the Conduct of United States Foreign Relations, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1949), p. 2.

become the principles which underlie United States' actions.

Formal internal factors are a most relevant portion of any discussion concerned with the factors which affect the formulation of American foreign policy. The paramount formal internal factor is the United States Constitution, which stipulates that the Federal government will be hegemonic in the field of foreign relations and that, generally, the powers of the National government will be separated into three branches.

In regard to the first stipulation, the Constitution specifically denies the states any independent authority or powers in the conduct of foreign affairs. "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation;...No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,...enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, ..."[8] Thus, in relations with other nations, the Federal government is, formally, the only voice expressing United States sovereignty.

In regard to the second stipulation, that of the separation of powers within the Federal government, the Constitution provides a paucity of direction in the field of foreign affairs. The authority of the Judiciary extends to law cases: involving treaties; affecting ambassadors and other American diplomatic officers; involving admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; and arising between states or individuals and foreign states or individuals.

Direction concerned with Executive authority in foreign affairs is limited to designating the President to be Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and to make treaties and appoint ambassadors and other public officers, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Additionally,

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[8] U.S. Constitution, I, Sec. 10, cl, 1, 3.

the President is designated to receive ambassadors and other diplomatic officers and to ensure that the laws of the United States are faithfully executed. Lastly, he may, from time-to-time, recommend to the Legislature action that he considers necessary.

The Legislature is empowered to: borrow money in behalf of the United States; regulate foreign commerce; establish naturalization regulations; regulate the value of foreign currency; define and punish certain offenders of International Law; impose and collect taxes and duties to provide for the defense and welfare of the United States; and "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States...."[9]

Additional formal internal factors include statutes, administrative regulations, executive orders, and judicial decisions. These, however, through time, tend to encompass, include, and reflect the informal internal factors of custom, precedent, and public opinion. Therefore, in order to preclude an historical investigation of minutiae in the process of becoming statutory, the influence of formal, less Constitutional, and informal factors will be jointly handled. Their influence has had three major effects upon the formulation of American foreign policy, which bring about a divergence from the framework intended by the Constitution. The first is that the Judiciary plays virtually no role in foreign policy, so that the resulting separation of powers has become a bilateral division between the Executive and the Legislature. The second is that between the Executive

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[9] Ibid., I, sec. 8, cl. 18.

and the Legislature there has been an adulteration of functions to the point that the Executive occasionally legislates and the Legislature initiates. Further, areas of joint or co-jurisdictional influence have emerged. Thirdly, as previously stated, there has been an unintended accretion of power in the executive branch.

Therefore, as a result of the effects of both formal and informal internal factors, the extant governmental framework for the formulation of foreign policy appears very different from that intended by the Constitution.

In addition to those powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Executive has accrued powers as a result of both external and internal factors. These powers operate in three indistinct realms of Presidential hegemony: the President as the National Leader (Executive powers); the President as the external representative of American sovereignty (Federative powers); and the President as the Party Leader (Political powers). Actions and decisions taken by the President in the field of foreign relations are often a combination of these three powers, which makes difficult any attempt to separate and identify them.

Thus, in addition to his Constitutional powers, the President wields both traditional and emergency powers. His traditional powers in foreign relations include his right to make executive agreements with the heads of other states. Executive agreements are divided into three types: First, those made by the President without prior Congressional consultation or concurrence, such as the Yalta Agreement; second, those made by the President based upon both prior Congressional concurrence and prior United States law, such as reciprocal trade agreements; and third, those made by the President with the stipulation that they do not become effective

until implemented by Congress, such as the United Nations Participation Act of 1945.

A further traditional power of the President is his authority to extend recognition or sever diplomatic relations, both of which grew out of his Constitutional power to receive and appoint ambassadors. The appointive power, of course, requires the advice and consent of the Senate.

Since constitutionally the President was charged with primary responsibility in the field of foreign relations and since information was necessary for policy formulation and execution, the executive branch has enjoyed a virtual moncpoly in the collection and evoluation of intelligence. Further, since the President must consider the merit of keeping both the intelligence and its sources classified, he exercises discretionary powers in its release to the public. It should be noted, however, that this power is often challenged by the Legislature.

As a result of tradition and of the expansion of communication media, the Executive has accrued what might aptly be termed "Public Relations Powers." This amounts to his use of press conferences, "fireside chats," and briefings to influence or mold public opinion in support of his decisions or actions.

The President as the party leader wields political powers which, historically, have been manifested through patronage, "pork-barrelling," and his potential "endorsement" of Congressional candidates in elections.

From his Federative and Commander-in-Chief powers, the Executive, as has been stated, can publicly commit the United States to specified policies that virtually preclude Congressional repudiation. Examples of this power are President Truman's decision to send troops to Korea and President

Kennedy's action in establishing a naval blockade of Cuba.

The President also has certain legislative powers, for many of the legislative enactments in the field of foreign policy have had their origin, direction, and framing within the executive branch of the government. The Greek-Turkish Aid Program and the Point Four Program are examples of this Executive power.

In addition to these powers accruing to the Chief Executive as a result of custom, tradition, and usage, there are also wide emergency powers which have been bestowed upon him. National crises have called for the expansion and exercise of Executive powers to the point that one writer on the subject claims that during time of war the President exercises almost monarchical authority in foreign relations.[10]

These, then, are the extra-Constitutional powers which reside in the hands of the Executive and which help to describe the extant governmental framework for the formulation of American foreign policy.

Executive powers, however, have not been the only ones modified by external and internal factors. Contemporary powers of the Legislature are very different from those intended by the Constitution. In addition to the Senate's executive powers, the House's appropriation powers, and Congress' general legislative and war-making powers, the Legislature has acquired extra-Constitutional authority. A Brookings Institution report considers that the right to conduct investigations is one of the major bases for Congressional participation in the conduct of foreign relations.[11]

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[10] Blair Bolles, Who Makes Our Foreign Policy? Headline Series No. 62 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., March 20, 1947), p. 9.

[11] The Brookings Institution, Governmental Mechanism for the Conduct of United States Foreign Relations, p. 41.

The Legislature also exercises power and influence in foreign relations by means of Congressional resolutions which, although they have no legal sanction, reflect and affect public opinion and Executive action. Such a resolution was that which the Senate passed that argued against the admission of Red China into the United Nations.

Related to this power, is that of the influence of actions taken by individual members of Congress. A speech by one important legislator can influence both public opinion and the President. Witness those made by Senator Keating concerning the construction of missile sites in Cuba.

Three final extra-Constitutional legislative powers have emerged. The first is that through travel and "inspection tours" Congressional committees and individuals have acquired both an influence over the execution of foreign policy and an expertise in the realm of foreign affairs. The second is that of members of the Legislature participating _ex-officio_ as executive agents, such as at the United Nations Charter Conference in San Francisco. Finally, Congress can exercise powers affecting foreign policy formulation by legislation determining the structure of the executive branch.

Here, then, is the existing governmental distribution of power for the formulation of American foreign policy. What effect this democratic framework has on effective foreign policy is discussed in the following section.

VIABLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND EFFECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY

In his introduction, the writer stated that democracies were at a disadvantage in the formulation and execution of effective foreign policy and that, in the absolute, the prerequisites of viable democratic government were antithetical to the prerequisites of effective foreign policy. These antipodal prerequisites are revealed, in differing degrees, in three aspects of democratic foreign policy formulation.

Firstly, American democracy requires and guarantees a diffusion of power through the instruments of separation of powers, checks and balances, and political parties. This diffusion is an intended obstacle to unity and coordination in the Federal government. The formulation of effective foreign policy, however, requires unified, coordinated governmental action designed to carry out long-range objectives.

Secondly, American democracy, as a Free and Open Society, distrusts secrecy and emphasizes popular control over policy-makers through representation. Max Beloff refers to a "democratic foreign policy" as one which includes: the avoidance of secret diplomacy; the control of foreign policy by the Legislature; and the direct consultation of the people on important issues.[12] Yet, National Survival frequently requires that much foreign policy be formulated and executed secretly and swiftly by the Executive.

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[12] Max Beloff, Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), p. 53.

Thirdly, American democracy tends to seek moral justification for foreign policy actions. Many Americans think that "moral exhortation is a sufficient diplomatic weapon; and they are still oblivious to the fact--and it is a fact--that the ultimate arbiter of a difference of opinion is force."[13] Thus, the moralistic approach to foreign policy tends to divorce force from diplomacy and tends to promote an imbalance between commitments and power. Walter Lippmann states:

> Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.[14]

That these three innate disadvantages in the formulation and execution of foreign policy are the result of American democracy is the subject matter of the following discussion.

In order to safeguard the individual's rights and liberties from encroachment by the state, the Founding Fathers purposely limited the powers of government by the system of separation of powers and checks and balances. That these institutional safeguards have a deleterious effect upon the formulation of American foreign policy will now be shown.

The problem of formulating coordinated, unified, and effective foreign policies is manifested in four relationships: Coordination within the executive branch; coordination within the legislative branch; coordination between the Executive and the Legislature; and coordination between

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[13] Dexter Perkins, The Evolution of American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 173.

[14] Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943), p. 7.

the Government and the people.[15] Further, these problems of coordination can take place on three levels: institutional discord, partisan controversies, and individual, personal animosities between key individuals.

Coordination within the executive branch is made difficult by the tremendous proliferation of foreign policy functions and responsibilities in recent years as a result of the widening scope of governmental activities and the international position of the United States. Agencies which historically handled foreign policy have been reorganized and enlarged. New agencies have been created and other agencies have, since World War II, for the first time, acquired foreign policy functions.

Since a thorough inquiry of foreign policy coordination in the executive branch would require a study at least of equal magnitude to this essay, only the most significant problems are herein discussed.

The President attempts to coordinate foreign policy among his departments and independent agencies through the Executive Office of the President which includes the White House Office, the Bureau of the Budget, the Council of Economic Advisers, the National Security Council, the National Security Resources Board, and the Central Intelligence Agency. He also makes wide use of interdepartmental committees to effect coordination.

Outside of the President himself, the most important executive institution for the conduct of foreign relations is the Department of State, headed by the Secretary of State. State Department coordination of foreign policies takes place on both institutional and personal levels in

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[15] The Brookings Institution, Governmental Mechanism for the Conduct of United States Foreign Relations, p. 1.

three executive-branch relationships: the first is between the Secretary and the President, which is largely determined by individual personalities. Whereas John Foster Dulles was given a virtual free rein in the conduct of foreign relations, Dean Rusk has an obvious subordinate role to the incumbent President. The second relationship is between the Department of State and other executive departments. Whereas State attempts to provide departmental-level foreign policy coordination, its own substantive interests and activities preclude complete success. The third relationship is within the Department itself, between functional and geographic bureaux, between the Foreign Service Officers and the Civil Service specialists, and between those who make policy and those who explain policy. State Department efficacy in foreign policy, then, is conditional upon the resolution of many diverse factors.

International and especially United States concern with security has resulted in the emergence of the Department of Defense as a vital institution in the field of foreign relations. In many ways, this emergence represents a digression from the moralistic approach to foreign policy which the writer intends to criticize below. It does not, however, completely remove the basis for that criticism. The Defense Department is subject to the same divisive and fragmenting general relationships that plague State. Moreover, the Department of Defense's intradepartmental coordination is made even more difficult by both the individual and collective roles played by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further there exists the continuing problem of civil-military relations.

Presented here are only two executive departments concerned with foreign policy. In addition to the other departments and agencies

tangentially influential, McCamy, writing in 1950, counted some 130 subsidiary interagency committees concerned with various phases of American foreign policy.[16] The writer contends that even the diffusion of power within the executive branch of government, and its resultant lack of unity and coordination in the field of foreign relations, is at least partially a result of the democratic fear of overcentralization and the tyranny of one-man rule.

The second major problem is that of the coordination within the Legislature. Whereas partisan controversies have only a minor position in executive coordination, they become, with institutional discord, the major factors creating legislative disunity and decentralization.

Institutional discord may be further divided into organizational and procedural factors. One organizational factor: contributing to disunity is the existence of two houses of Congress with differing responsibilities, representation, composition, and tenure. A second is that of partisan distribution and composition and a third is the relationship of members of Congress to the public.

Procedural factors include problems of coordination and jurisdiction among standing policy committees and between these standing policy committees and appropriations committees. Two further procedural factors contribute to Congressional disunity in foreign policy. The first is party discipline. The reliance placed by many writers on the benefits of bipartisanship in foreign affairs appears, to the writer, to be a condemnation of partisan politics "beyond the water's edge." If this is so, then it is a rejection of party discipline in foreign affairs, within the

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[16] James L. McCamy, The Administration of American Foreign Affairs (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 146.

Legislature. Strangely enough, then, members of Congress are criticized both for their party solidarity and their political independence. To this writer, transgression of party platforms is more frequent in the majority party than in the minority, which has a tendency toward unity. These majority transgressions encourage disunity and fragmentation.

The second and final procedural factor is that of the sectional, minority, and particular pressures emanating from a Congressman's constituency. Especially preceding elections is this an important factor in determining legislative action in foreign policy.

These institutional and partisan factors create what Cheever and Haviland call a "Congress bogged down in a morass of complexities without sufficient discipline, skilled analysis, or coordination to do its job adequately" in foreign affairs.[17]

Coordination between the Executive and the Legislature constitutes the third major problem area in foreign policy arising from the system of separation of powers and checks and balances.

Cheever and Haviland state that "...under our system of government, the executive-legislative relationship is the weakest link in our foreign-policy chain."[18] Finletter, further, claims that this weak relationship is endemic:

> ...the American system is so constituted that it produces a conflict between the Executive and Congress every time the Executive tries to be positive and strong. You cannot

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[17] Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field Haviland, Jr., American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 208.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 164.

> have a government capable of handling the most difficult problems that peace-time democracy has ever faced with the two main parts of it at each other's throats.[19]

Problems of executive-legislative coordination take place on three levels. The first of these is institutional discord, resulting from both formal and informal internal factors previously discussed. Institutional discord has recently taken on new importance with the growing need for legislation and appropriations to support foreign policy. On his side, the Executive represents foreign policy formulation and execution through the Departments of State and Defense. In addition, he controls the data and intelligence upon which foreign policy must be based. The President, further, represents the closest approach to unity in the field of foreign affairs. On the other hand, the Legislature holds the purse strings for foreign policy implementation and execution. It has the power to accept or reject treaties and appointments and the power to declare war. Congress through its representative role is the principal instrument of democratic control over Executive actions in foreign affairs. However, as a result of its representative character, its mechanism for influencing foreign policies is highly decentralized and diversified.

Since the Executive and the Legislature have both independent and co-jurisdictional powers in foreign affairs, discord arises as to which branch will enjoy leadership, greater influence and control in foreign policy formulation. The President has an obligation to determine objectives which are in the National Interest and Congress has an obligation to preserve popular control over vital decisions of the Federal government. The lack of a clear dividing line between the two invites competition between the

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[19] Thomas K. Finletter, op. cit., p. 9.

two branches over foreign policy decisions. Nor can this competition, and resultant discord, be eliminated from a democratic government, for giving the Executive power to dictate to Congress would result in authoritarianism and giving the Legislature power to dictate to the President would result in divided and impotent government.

In addition to these architectural divisions, a problem of coordination is raised by partisan controversies. Especially when the Executive and a majority of the Legislature are of differing political parties, but even when a President has a majority in Congress, his foreign policies are frequently attacked by members of the opposition party hoping to reap partisan benefits.

Finally, foreign policy coordination often suffers as a result of personal animosities between the President and Congressional leaders, particularly, but not limited to, members of the opposition party.

Thus the institutional, partisan, and personality barriers to effective executive-legislative coordination preclude the formulation and execution of well-integrated, adequately-implemented foreign policies. There is in the United States government no central authority for the coordination of these many diverse influences and powers affecting the formulation and execution of foreign policy.

A fourth relationship which constitutes an obstacle to the formulation of effective foreign policy is that of coordination between the government and the people. As has been noted, one of the cornerstones of a democracy is that governmental policy-makers and their actions must be subject to popular control, either directly, through elections or indirectly, through representation. Moreover, with the improvements in modern communications, policy-makers are subjected to virtual day-to-day public

influences and opinion.

A major difficulty emerging in any discussion of the "public" or "public opinion" is a definition of terms, for "public" in both senses challenges precise definition. "Public" is considered by some to mean the aggregate population as a continuum existing through time. To others, it implies the point-in-time, "man-in'the-street" opinion and to still others, it is the power elites who actually bring influence to bear on policy-makers and their actions. To this writer, "public" equals the total population. In respect to foreign policy, the public is divided into two groups: a knowledgeable public and an uninformed public. Kriesburg, writing about the 1946 public, conducted polls which showed that 30% of the electorate was unaware of any given event in American foreign affairs, 45% was aware but uninformed, and only 25% showed any knowledge at all.[20] Thus the writer's knowledgeable public, upon the basis of those statistics, would comprise only one-fourth of the electorate. Yet this informed public should be further divided into articulate shapers of public opinion with no personal axes to grind, such as educators, commentators, and editorial writers and organized self-interest groups desirous of effecting personally-beneficial action.

Several generalizations can be made concerning the uninformed public, with which Lippmann is concerned when he refers to the "functional derangement...between the mass of the people and the government."[21]

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[20] Martin Kriesburg, "Dark Areas of Ignorance," Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, ed. Lester Market (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), p. 51.

[21] Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (New York: The New American Library, 1955), p. 19.

intelligence and opinion.

A major difficulty encountered in any discussion of the "public" or "public opinion" is the definition of terms, for "public" in most usages challenges precise definition. "Public" is interpreted by some to mean the aggregate population of a democracy existing through time. To others, it implies the person-in-the-street, "man-in-the-street" which can be very others, or as the power elites who actually exert influence on policy-making and their content. To this writer, "public" only is the total population. In contrast to foreign policy, the public in domestic areas are around a knowledgeable public and an uninformed public. Elsewhere, writing about the 1960 public, conducted polls which showed that 75% of the electorate were unaware of any given event in American foreign affairs, and were aware but uninterested, and only 15% showed any knowledge at all.[20] Thus the writer's knowledgeable public, upon the basis of these statistics, would comprise only one-tenth of the electorate. But this informed public should be further divided into attentive segments of public opinion with an informed bias to action, such as minorities, conservatives, and extremists [illegible] organized [illegible] groups [illegible] of altering community-based action.

Several generalizations can be made regarding the [illegible] public, with which Lippmann is concerned when he refers to the "wholesale democrats". between the [illegible] of the people and the government.[21]

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[20] [illegible], "[illegible]," Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, ed. Lester Markel (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), p. 31.

[21] Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (New York: The New American Library, 1955), p. 14.

The uninformed American public is largely reactive, lethargic, moralistic, and "wants quick results; it will sacrifice tomorrow's real benefit for today's apparent advantage."[22] This is the public most easily swayed by governmental public relations but it is also the public least-effectively represented in policy-making.

To this writer, the only public that contributes positively to the formulation and execution of American foreign policies is that which is composed of the articulate leaders, hoping to recommend objectives and policies in the National Interest. The influence of the self-interested division of the knowledgeable public appears to be most deleterious for not only is it vociferous and influential but it represents particular, minority interests which have little concern with National Interests. Unfortunately, this self-interested public, through lobbying and concerted actions, is disproportionately influential over the formulation and execution of American foreign policies.

Therefore, in the over-all relationship between the government and the people, the public represents diversified groupings in support of often-inconsistent objectives and policies, some of which are antithetical to the pursuit of the National Interests.

Thus, in each of these four relationships (coordination within the Executive, the Legislature, between Executive and Legislature, and between the government and the people) is apparent a lack of unity and concerted, coordinated action to protect and promote the National Interests.

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[22] Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (3rd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 146.

While this disunity and diffusion of power guarantees the perpetuation of democratic government, it is a major obstacle to the formulation and execution of effective foreign policy.

A second prerequisite of American democracy includes the avoidance of secrecy and the consultation of the people on important issues. These standards form the basis for the continued existence of a free and open society. Yet, although they are prerequisites for a democracy, they are at variance with effective foreign policy on two counts. The first is that whereas

> The survival of democracy demands that as much information as possible be made public; the survival of the nation may require that vast quantities of such information be classified as secret.[23]

Although frequently challenged by both the Legislature and the public in this regard, the Executive, as the source and controller of intelligence, must preserve the secrecy of much information. The reasons for this preservation are three-fold: first, the specific sources of much intelligence information must be protected; second, revealing all the bases for foreign policy formulation jeopardizes its effectiveness; and, third, the revelation of information prejudicial to National Security is not compatible with preservation of the National Interests.

The consultation of the public on vital issues is at variance with effective foreign policy primarily in regard to speed and decisiveness. Many foreign policies, to be effective, cannot endure the discussion and debate characteristic of public consultation. It cannot wait for public

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[23] Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1960), p. 57.

approval but must be formulated and executed by governmental officials hoping to act in the National Interests. Of this Dexter Perkins says "...the necessities of a more active and of a more decisive and swift-acting diplomacy tend to modify our constitutional forms."[24]

The third and final prerequisite of American democracy disadvantageous to the conduct of effective foreign policies is that referred to by Kennan when he states:

> ...I see the most serious fault of our past policy formulation to lie in something that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems.[25]

As discussed in the section dealing with American theoretical bases of foreign policy formulation, this legalistic-moralistic approach was a result of isolationism, continental insularity, the distrust of and distaste for European power politics, the belief in indigenous American superiority, and in the innate goodness of man--that people are good and rulers are evil. Its primary manifestation in the foreign policy field has been a divorce between force and diplomacy.

The evolution of the American divorce of power from international relations is traced by Spanier:

> Democratic...theory posits that man is a rational and moral creature, and that differences among men can be settled by rational persuasion and moral exhortation....Peace--the result of harmony among men--was thus the natural or normal state.[26]

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[24] Perkins, op. cit., p. 170.

[25] George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 95.

[26] Spanier, op. cit., p. 5.

Conflict, then, is represented as a deviation from the norm and must be a result of immoral states disregarding the harmony of interests among men. A belief in American moral superiority and international immorality are the results of this thinking. Only when its very existence is jeopardized should America project her influence into the international arena. The resultant war effort, being based upon universal moralistic principles is punitive which "...goes far to explain the difficulty we have in employing force for rational and restrictive purposes...."[27]

In comparison with the Messianic democratic war effort and the mutually-exclusive states of conflict and harmony, peacetime foreign policies are expected to preserve the harmony among men, even in an anarchic community, unsupported by force and national resources. To quote Spanier once again:

> The result of this depreciation of power and moralistic approach to foreign policy is the inability of the United States to relate military power to political objectives. Yet, only if the two are combined can a nation conduct an effective foreign policy.[28]

Here presented, then, are the three dichotomous prerequisites of viable democratic government, on the one hand, and effective foreign policy on the other. At this stage of the inquiry, the most logical question that a reader would ask is how the American experience in democratic government has been able to exist for almost two hundred years if it embraces these intrinsic barriers to the formulation and execution of effective foreign policy. The criticism is answered by the fact that only in

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[27] George F. Kennan, op. cit., p. 84.

[28] Spanier, op. cit., p. 12.

[illegible], then, is [illegible] must be a result of [illegible] among them. A nation in isolation could [illegible] the [illegible]ity was the results of this thinking. Only when its very existence is jeopardized would America project herself into the international arena. The results are effort, being based upon outmoded and [illegible] principles in negative which "...goes a long way to explain the difficulty we find in organizing force for rational and constructive purposes....."[1]

In connection with the American [illegible] the [illegible] of the community—including states of conflict and harmony, [illegible] in [illegible], [illegible] it is [illegible] by [illegible] and [illegible]. To quote Spanier once again:

> The reason of this preponderance of power and [illegible] in foreign policy is the inability of the United States to relate military power to political objectives. Yet, only if the two are combined can a nation conduct an effective foreign policy."[2]

This being said, then, are the [illegible] of [illegible] democratic government, on the one hand, and effective foreign policy on the other. [illegible] the [illegible] of the country, the more [illegible] that a nation would [illegible] government that [illegible] for almost two hundred years [illegible] effective foreign policy. This [illegible] is [illegible] by the fact that only in

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[1] George F. Kennan, op.cit., p. 59.

[2] Spanier, op.cit., p. 11.

recent years has America been thrust into the international milieu and given world-wide responsibilities as a bastion of peace and freedom. As stated earlier, American external relationships and security were guaranteed by insular isolation, weak continental neighbors, and the geographic distance from the historical pivotal point of international politics. Since the Second World War and the shift of international power from its historical centers, American democracy has been put to the test.

CONCLUSION

> ...the goals and methods of policy formation cannot be stated in terms of efficiency alone, at least in a democratic society. We are committed to the idea that government in some way ought to reflect the demands of the governed. It is not enough, in other words, to achieve efficient, intelligent foreign policy if the price is the destruction of the institutions of democratic government.[29]

As a result of the dichotomy between viable democratic government and effective foreign policy, a vital question emerges: which is more important to the United States of America? The writer contends that democracy should prevail, but the trend appears in the opposite direction.

A recapitulation of those areas in which the two aims come into conflict will give weight to the allegation that American constitutional democracy is suffering as a result of modifications undertaken to pursue effective foreign policy.

In order to override the separation of powers and checks and balances instituted by the Constitution, the emergency powers of the Executive have expanded and lost much of their traditionally temporary character. As an extension of those powers, the Executive has made wide use of his power to commit the nation publicly to a course of action and to deploy the military of the United States without a declaration of war.

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[29] James N. Murray, Jr. "Foreign Policy," Functions and Policies of American Government, ed. Jack W. Peltason and James M. Burns (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1958), p. 60.

In order to annul popular and legislative distaste for secrecy and a desire for consultation, the Executive has relied upon CIA-Type appropriations, overclassification of information, and what one writer calls "Crisis Centralization." Lasswell elaborates:

> Crisis requires rapidity of decision as a means of national security; rapidity favors centralized final decision; centralization favors the exercise of effective power by a self-perpetuating few. As crisis continues demand for democratic process grows weaker, and popular government passes into oligarchy, absolutism, or tyranny.[30]

In order to overcome the legalistic-moralistic approach of democracy, the Executive has relied upon both crisis centralization and the universal fears of cultural and biological extinction.

> Some have even wondered whether the American democracy is congenitally incapable of carrying out sustained and effective foreign policies in the midst of recurrent international crises, within a domestic environment of chronic citizen apathy and lack of understanding of complex external problems...Communist policy-makers are unhampered by such potentially divisive factors....They therefore possess an enormous advantage over the United States and other democratic governments with respect to ability to formulate long-range diplomatic objectives....[31]

The dilemma of whether to preserve democratic values or effective foreign policy makes decisions difficult. Without sacrificing our democratic values to a form of authoritarianism, the writer has no solution.

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[30] Harold D. Lasswell, "Political Power and Democratic Values," Problems of Power in American Democracy, ed. Arthur Kornhauser (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957), p. 58.

[31] Crabb, op. cit., p. 125.

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